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Abstract
One of the advantages of using formal methods in design should be that we can be precise
about where our methods fail. However, it is rare to )nd discussions in the literature of problems
in applying formal methods—particularly in the early stages of design. One reason for this is
that failures are often caused by the context in which a method is applied, rather than by some
purely technical limitation. Using examples from research in which I have been involved I shall
describe some of the pitfalls I have encountered and which I have observed frequently in the
research of others. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Berry, in this issue [1], advocates the use of appropriately chosen and applied formal
methods in the early stages of design lifecycles—observing factors outside the technical
considerations of the methods themselves which in8uence their success. This paper is
complementary to Berry’s discussion because it looks at some factors which can lead
to failure. It has been unfashionable for those using logic-based methods to introspect
about causes of failures. This is a pity because without the possibility of failure our
research is not experimental and without the ability to learn from failure we are unlikely
to develop robust engineering methods.
To avoid being accused of preying on other unsuspecting researchers, I have taken all
the examples of pitfalls from my own research and where others have been involved I
have generalised the examples. In none of the projects I describe were the mistakes fatal
but this was largely because they were small scale, which made corrections simpler to
make. Larger research e?orts might not have the manoeuverability to )x these problems
at acceptable cost. Once explained, some of the pitfalls may seem obvious but, given
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how frequently signs of these can be found in the research of others, I suspect that
they are much easier to recognise with hindsight than to predict.
In what follows, I use “model” to refer to the set of logical expressions used to
describe some problem. This is used instead of the word “speci)cation” because in
early design we often use models of problems which are not directly speci)cations of
systems (see [11] or the introduction of [12]). I have also used the phrase “inference
system” in a broad sense to denote any system which has been built with the intention
of using or synthesising expressions in a mathematical logic.
2. Choice of inference system
Formal de)nition takes place within a chosen system of inference. Although in theory
there is great deal of overlap between inference systems, so that it should be easy to
translate de)nitions from one to another, in practice our choice of system emphasises
particular features of the problem. For example, a modal temporal logic is a natural
choice if we are tackling a problem in which we need to prove that certain propositions
eventually hold of our system model. However, those inference rules which allow us
to deal readily with the temporal aspects of problems may be a distraction in problems
for which we do not need to prove temporal properties. This issue is well known and
is being addressed, in part, by those whose interest is in making it easier to combine
or translate between inference systems. There remain some subtle diIculties which
cannot be solved simply by deepening formal theory.
There are hundreds of specialised formal calculi, for describing certain forms of
uncertainty, for expressing temporal information, etc. If we are lucky enough to have
a problem which obviously suits a particular class of calculi then we may reduce our
choice to a few front runners but we may have to dig deeply into the theory of each
competitor before we can decide on a winner. For example, in [5] it is demonstrated
that any problem representable in Dempster–Shafer theory can be represented in the
incidence calculus and vice versa. Unwary readers might be led to believe by this result
that the two calculi are equivalent. This would be a mistake because in [10] a version of
incidence calculus is described which for some situations involving dependent evidence
gives the intuitively correct answer when Dempster–Shafer theory does not. In other
words, the comparison between these two inference systems depends on exactly which
version of each system we are comparing and on what sort of equivalence we wish
to demonstrate. It is hard to understand such comparisons deeply without becoming
an expert in all of the inference systems one might want to use—a prohibitively time
consuming task since domain problems do not always neatly )t into a small class of
related inference systems—but without deep knowledge we can easily misjudge the
capabilities of the systems we intend to use.
One reaction to the problem of selecting a specialised logic is to begin projects with a
general-purpose logic, perhaps with a commonly accepted computational interpretation.
For instance, we might use Horn clauses with the resolution-based inference strategy
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familiar to logic programmers. We would then write all our formal expressions in the
form: C←P1 ∧ · · · ∧Pn, where C is the atomic conclusion and each P is an atomic
condition with the special condition, true, being used in cases for which C is true
unconditionally. What happens if we )nd that we need to represent concepts such as
temporal change within our model? There are at least two technical solutions:
• Use the same inference system but add axioms which deal with temporal e?ects. An
example is the event calculus [8].
• Use a di?erent inference system containing proof rules which deal with temporal
change. An example is the temporal logic of actions [9].
Whichever solution is chosen, there is a cost to the extension which is not purely
technical: it is necessary to negotiate the extension to the logic with others working
on the project and to re-train them in the tasks which they must now perform in
the new style. The reason why this can become a serious problem in early design is
that the problems we are modelling often are loosely bounded and it is easy to )nd
complex logical puzzles within them. Why stop at a temporal extension when there
are also interesting issues of typing, higher-order function application, etc., which we
can )nd in the problem if we stare hard enough? Such problems tend to fascinate the
logicians in a project so it is easy to slide down a slippery slope of increasing language
complexity, incurring a cumulative cost in negotiation and education in addition to the
normal technical overheads.
3. Boundaries of formality
Most uses of formality in early design require some degree of interaction with
humans in a domain of application. They may be manipulating formal expressions
in order to describe a model or assisting in the knowledge acquisition needed to build
a domain-speci)c synthesis system or analysing information deduced from a model dur-
ing validation. Whatever the point of interaction and regardless of the sophistication
of the interface to the formal system, it will be necessary to commit to a human inter-
pretation of at least some of the formal symbols manipulated by the inference system.
A system for deciding on the mappings between human and formal language in some
domain is often called an ontology. To work perfectly, everyone who needs to use an
ontology must follow the same conventions in relating human to formal representation.
There are two surprises here: the )rst is how deep di?erences in interpretation of on-
tologies can be; the second is that usable systems can be produced even when such
di?erences occur.
In the knowledge based systems community, ontological research has become a
major research theme (see [14] for a survey). The most common strategy is to )x
on a bounded domain of application and devise a restricted formal language which
those working in the domain use to describe problems. This shared language is used
as the basis for sharing information. In our ecological work [13] we attempted to do
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this for a class of ecological modelling problems—the idea being to use the domain
ontology to provide a language in which ecologists describe problems and then to
use the formal problem description to control the generation of appropriate ecosystem
models. This meant that we had to worry about what words like “biomass” should
be taken to mean. Depending on who one speaks to, the answer to this question is
di?erent. The most crude de)nition is “mass of biological material”. A more precise
de)nition might be “mass of biological material once all water has been removed”.
For specialist sub-domains the de)nition might be “mass of biological material which
has been subjected to the following treatment to remove water...”. In other words,
there is no broadly applicable de)nition of basic concepts like “biomass” which suits
all situations. The search for consensus on such issues quickly took us into waters
which were uncharted even for our domain experts. One reaction to this might be
to shy away from domain-speci)c ontologies and rely instead on domain-independent
terminology from stable technical communities. This route also fails, as we explain
below.
An example of a stable technical community is in uncertain reasoning but even here
we can )nd di?erences in formal interpretation of basic expressions. A manifestation
of this appeared in an electronic mail debate which took place on the uai mailing
list in the early summer of 1998. At issue was the common practice of referring
to the X in the expression P(X = x), where P is the probability that X has value
x, as a “random variable”. This sort of notation is often used formally to represent
statements like “The probability that the colour of my car is black”, which might be
P(car colour= black). The diIculty is that from the point of view of classical )rst-
order logic it is hard to think of car colour as a logical variable—one feels obliged
to think of it as a function from cars to colours. On the other hand, it is often natural
to describe it as a “variable” because it is one of the points in a problem description
for which we are interested in variation. This is a di?erent notion of variable from the
classical logical one but is no less valid, and has similarities to the use of expressions
such as “state variable” in process modelling. Although the use made of variables, of
whatever kind, is precise and internally consistent within inference systems, the way
we use natural language to refer to them di?ers across inference systems.
It seems that, no matter what we do, we cannot achieve a perfect ontology. Then why
does formal modelling ever succeed? The reason is that we try to deploy these models
in situations in which the inevitable ontological mismatches will either be checked or
will have negligible impact on the task which we are interested in performing. In the
ecological modelling work we were careful to avoid building into the model generation
mechanism any heuristics which relied on a particular interpretation of “biomass” other
than as the name of an attribute of certain objects in our problem description. The price
we paid for this was that our generator could not provide as much automatic control
over model construction as it might if it made more commitments to the meaning
of domain-speci)c concepts. We gladly paid this price in order to avoid the project
foundering on arguments about the domain theory which, via the ontology, we would
have been forced to embed within our inference system.
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4. Fitting in with people in the domain
A well-known problem in early design is in de)ning who will be expected to main-
tain and bene)t from the inference system we build. For the purposes of this paper I
shall ignore that problem—although it is embarrassing to remember how frequently I
and others have said “the user” in technical papers instead of some more enlightening
description of the people expected to bene)t from some applied system. There are other
less obvious pitfalls which await the unwary.
One of the most diIcult human factors to control in a research project of more than a
few months duration is when to acquaint collaborators in the domain of application with
the formal methods we are using. It has been said (in [4] for example) that the delay in
seeing a return for an investment in formal methods is one of the key impediments to
their success in industry. I suspect this is true in applications in which the problem is
identi)ed clearly and the task is to describe it as succinctly and precisely as possible. In
this situation we have to wait until the end before we have the “complete” result which
is required. However, in early design we are much more likely to be building prototype
systems to explore what the tractable problems are. We then have to choose how soon
we want to have these ready. Simple prototypes can occasionally be produced extremely
rapidly. The fastest I have ever done this is producing a 16-predicate logic program
to demonstrate inference of chemical pathways within two hours of meeting a group
of plant microbiologists for the )rst time. The longest time to release a prototype is
roughly two years for a system we built to relate codes of practice to a safety shutdown
system built using parameterisable components (see [6] for an overview of this).
Taking too long to release a prototype can cause unpredictable problems because in
that length of time the circumstances of industrial partners can change. For example, it
would have been better, with hindsight, to have produced more quickly a less impres-
sive prototype system for the safety shutdown domain because at the two year point
our industrial collaborators happened to be under greater workload than hitherto, so
they had less time to spend with us. Longer gestation periods give more opportunities
for accidents like this to happen.
On the other hand, very rapid prototyping can raise expectations too high. Often
complicated problems contain a sub-problem which is easy to tackle in an appropriate
inference system. To those with little experience of such methods the initial results can
seem almost magical and it can be diIcult to explain that other essential tasks may
be orders of magnitude more diIcult. Without careful management, a fast return for
investment can be as damaging as a slow return.
Ironically, rapid prototyping can also have an opposing e?ect. Prototypes invite con-
structive criticism and domain experts are normally good at spotting what they do not
like or would wish extended. As we saw in Section 2, it is easy to feel the urge
to increase the complexity of an inference system and the feedback from early proto-
types may increase this pressure. Changes in support systems, such as visual interfaces,
do not necessarily change in harmony with the core inference methods; so relatively
small changes in the style of inference may require radical overhaul of the prototype
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implementation and vice versa. This can tip a project into a cycle of rapid prototyping
which takes a long time to achieve consensus because there is always some new and
exciting variant to build.
5. Education
As Berry points out in this issue [1], one aim in early design is to explore the
portions of the domain problem which developers do not know and which customers
do not know. Normally some form of education is required on each side in order to
reach a shared view of the problem which is adequate for the task in hand. There are
many pitfalls in education but here I shall take one example of each type—)rst in the
education of customers and then in the education of developers.
A popular way to make inference systems accessible to non-logicians is by providing
an environment which helps those non-logicians understand the system by connecting
it to concepts in which they may easily be trained. An example is techniques editing
(attributable, among others, to [7] with a survey of applications in [2]) which gives
an account of the structure of logic programs in terms of conceptual structures cor-
responding to tasks such as term decomposition in various forms via recursion, term
construction and so on. These structural patterns apply across all the clauses in predi-
cate and follow argument position, so predicates can be de)ned argument by argument
according to conceptual structure rather than building clause by clause or in some more
serendipitous way. Structure editors have been built which give libraries of patterns and
take care of many of the details of applying them. Conveniently, these patterns also
correspond to the way predicates are described when teaching logic programming: we
explain that a given predicate “decomposes a term in its )rst argument and constructs
a term in its second argument”, so it is tempting to think that tools like this help
non-logicians learn how to write logic programs. A group of psychologists (then at
the University of Loughborough) led by Tom Ormerod ran some tests comparing the
performance of undergraduate students using one of our techniques editors within a
Prolog programming course to a similar group of students taught using a normal text
editor. Those using the techniques editor did indeed write appropriate de)nitions faster
than those without. However, their innate ability to understand example problems in
logic programming terms did not seem to be any better than those who had not used
the editor. One explanation for this is that they had learned to use the tool to build so-
lutions quickly but had not learned to think like skilled logic programmers. Sometimes
such skills are not necessary—we may want the inference system to be a mystery to
our customers because it would merely distract them. The pitfall here is in thinking
that education necessarily comes with tool support.
A more pernicious, and I suspect prevalent, pitfall occurs when we consider how the
developers of inference systems should be educated. It is often falsely assumed that
for those expert in an appropriate logic the only additional training is in the domain
itself—if our domain of application is in potato crop modelling then we need only to
D. Robertson / Science of Computer Programming 42 (2002) 29–38 35
talk with potato crop modellers and read a few books on the subject. In fact, there
is often need for additional training of the logic experts in knowledge representation.
This is because much of the teaching of logic focuses on the semantics of the chosen
logic and its proof theory. For these it suIces to use abstract descriptions such as
P→¬Q. In fact it is often better to use these because it makes abstract notions easier
to see, for example that the previous expression is equivalent in classical logic to
¬P ∨¬Q. However, this sort of expertise is di?erent from the expertise necessary to
decide on an ontology for a domain and apply that ontology in a way which provides
elegant, tractable descriptions of problems. Both forms of expertise are necessary to
tackle problems but not all experienced logicians are good at knowledge representation.
An example appears in Berry’s article in this issue. Notice that the sort of expertise in
which logicians are often de)cient is not the sort which is taught simply by presenting
abstract logic di?erently—for instance by instantiating the logical implication above
to penguin→¬ 1ies. These are additional skills, such as the ability to choose good
idealisations of problems, which are not guaranteed by an aptitude for abstract logic.
6. Evaluation
In research projects involving the construction of experimental, applied inference
systems we need some form of evaluation to assess what sorts of applied problems
can be tackled with the system and, if we are making usability claims, how easily
it can be used by those who work in the domain. We must then worry about the
cost of the evaluation e?ort; the degree to which empirical evaluation is likely to yield
meaningful results; and, in the most extreme case, whether it is possible for our system
to fail—that is, whether we are doing an experiment at all. In each of these three cases
the fact that we are evaluating an inference system can raise special diIculties.
Empirical evaluation is normally costly for any software implementation but inference
systems are often particularly expensive to evaluate because, even if we do our best
to )t them into standard work practices, they give people new ways of doing their
jobs. Describing ecological systems in a domain-speci)c formal language [13,3] was
new to those who tested our model generation systems. Describing shutdown systems
using parameterisable components in the way described in [6] is new to most safety
engineers. This makes it diIcult to relate old to new work practices. If the inference
system has not been embedded carefully within its host organisation then it may be
rated poorly just because it was badly introduced. If it is cosseted too carefully during
)eld trials then its rating may be arti)cially high. Attempting to get this right takes
time and money. For example, in the evaluations mentioned in Section 5 we were
interested in comparing student performance in Prolog programming with and without
a techniques editor. Both groups of students, with and without the editor, needed to be
taught Prolog. To avoid arti)cially boosting the editor’s performance because it was
being introduced by those who built it, the Prolog courses and accompanying testing
had to be done by other researchers in another University. To avoid a mis)t between
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the editor and the Prolog training course it was necessary to construct a variant of the
original course into which the editor was dovetailed. To allow comparison between
techniques editor and text editor courses some retrospective adaptation of the original
course was needed. All of this takes considerable e?ort beyond that of the evaluation
experiments themselves, and our example concerns an inference system which was built
in order to be tested this way. Frequently, the costs of carefully controlled evaluation
can be much higher.
Given the diIculty and cost of controlled evaluation it is little wonder that there are
few, if any, extensive usability evaluations of larger inference systems. An alternative
is to identify parts of the system and evaluate those. Here we meet at least another
two pitfalls for those using logical inference systems. It is standard practice to develop
these systems in a modular way so that the internal inference mechanisms are separa-
ble from but interacting with the external user interface. This can make it diIcult to
judge whether some faults turned up by evaluation could easily have been corrected
by some adjustment to either or both parts of the system. Perhaps a more serious pit-
fall is in assuming that evaluation is compositional, in the sense that we can evaluate
part of a system then combine that with evaluations of other parts to form a broader
evaluation. This is seldom possible, even if our inference system is compositional, for
two reasons. First, if the separately evaluated components have user interfaces then we
must ensure that a good interface for one is consistent with a good interface in the
other which may not be the case if they require modes of communication which are
mutually antagonistic. For example, we might have a good usability evaluation for a
sub-system which displays a graphical proof tree and, separately, a good evaluation
of a sub-system which displays structured terms in a similar graphical style but when
these are combined we get a poor usability evaluation because people are confused
by the uniform visual representation of di?erent formal concepts. The second form of
compositionality problem is created by changes in demand for the system as we con-
sider the broader lifecycle of which it must be a part. For instance, we are reasonably
con)dent from our evaluations of novice programmers that techniques editors )t well
into Prolog training courses. However, this does not mean that eventually techniques
editors will be part of all introductory Prolog courses because for that to happen it
would be necessary for them to mesh with the other tools which more experienced
Prolog programmers want to use. Our limited evaluation says nothing about that.
Ironically, the success of logicians in producing expressive and internally consistent
formal languages makes it easy for engineers to fall into the trap of designing evaluation
experiments which are not experiments at all because there is no possibility of failure.
Some examples of questions for which the answer will almost certainly be “yes”, given
enough e?ort and an expressive formal language are:
• Can a problem tackled in system X be tackled by a similar system Y ? The answer
will be “yes” if we work hard enough with system Y . This question is rather like
comparing programming languages—only interesting if we can compare the degree
of diIculty on clearly de)ned problems.
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• Can system Y be made to work better than system X on a given problem? The
answer will be “yes” if we are allowed unlimited adaptation of system Y . This is
interesting only if the changes to Y are carefully constrained.
• Can people be trained to use system X ? They almost certainly can if we choose them
carefully and give them enough resource and incentives. The interesting question is
whether the people, resources and incentives are available in any real domain.
• Will people become better at solving task T using system X ? If task T is of interest
and system X is relevant and people use it then they are very likely to get better at
the task just because they are getting practice (see Berry’s comments on the “second
time” phenomenon in this issue). The interesting question is whether they get better
faster than they would have done by normal means.
None of the above are necessarily the wrong thing to do. The pitfall here is in thinking
of these as giving some useful measure of empirical )tness of the method without
controlling the conditions under which the measure was obtained.
7. Conclusions
Mathematical method is a prerequisite to precise experimental method. However,
the former does not guarantee the latter. In preceding sections I have given examples
of mistakes which mathematical method alone cannot help us to avoid. These are
summarised below:
• The choice of inference system often changes during a project and this requires either
alteration of the current inference machinery or its substitution by a new system. It
can be diIcult to make the right choice of specialist inference system and, even if
it is the right choice, there can be high cost in re-education of co-researchers which
accompanies each change. Too many such changes cause failure to a project because
of the cumulative cost.
• The cost of producing an ontology is not just in inventing the domain-speci)c formal
language but in maintaining it once the system is deployed, since perfect ontologies
cannot be guaranteed. Over-commitment to perfecting an ontology causes failure
either during development, through irreconcilable arguments over what the ontol-
ogy should be, or after deployment, through inappropriate human interpretation of
inference system inputs or outputs.
• Formal methods are often criticised because they take too long to yield results but
this is not necessarily true in early design. Ironically, problems such as in8ated
expectations and perpetual prototyping can be caused by the ability of some inference
systems to tackle isolated parts of problems rapidly.
• Education is required to bring logicians and domain specialists closer together. We
sometimes assume that the tools we produce will help educate domain specialists
and that training in abstract logic is enough formal preparation for tackling problem
domains. Both assumptions can be false.
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• Through force of circumstance or naivete we may under-evaluate our systems be-
cause we cannot a?ord the cost, we lack a framework for structuring the evaluation,
or our programme of research was not in essence experimental.
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